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Does  It Work?
William  McCleary
Economic theory provides some justification for earmarking.
But in practice it has proven difficult to set up earmarking
mechanisms that are both efficient and independent,  and govern-
ments often override earmarking arrangements when they need
resources.
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Publlc  Economic$
"Public choice" economists (Buchanan and  expenditures, lie at the heart of the World
others) have shown that, under some circum-  Bank's disenchantment with highway funds.
stances, earmarking can facilitate agreement
about additional revenues and  expenditures  Skepticism about earmarking is justified
when there is no consensus about raising either  because in general it hasn't worked very well.
beparately. Earmarking also may provide some  Any earmarking scheme should meet a rather
protection for priority programs against shifting  formidable set of prerequisites, among which the
majorities, inefficiency, and corruption.  most important are:
In practice, pricing and taxation arrange-  * Is there a substantial overlap of beneficiar-
ments that lead to an appropriate allocation of  ies and taxpayers?  (Earmarking works best in
resources for the service in question - and that  local government situations and least well where
are relatively automatic and independent of  there are strong redistributional or social welfare
frequent administrative decisions - are difficult  objectives invclved.)
to set up.  Under a wide variety of circumstances
(such as extemalities and nonconstant returns to  * Is earmarking essential (in additional to
scale), efficient pricing and taxing would lead to  benefit charges) to ensure service quality or
unbalarced budgets for the earmarked fund and  revenue collection?
hence interdependence with the general budget.
In addition, earmarked funds seldom achieve in-  *  Will the pricing and taxing arrangements
dependence because they depend on government  lead automatically to the appropriate levels of
for additional, nonearmarked sources of funding  the service?
or on frequent govemrnment  decisions about
prices or taxes for the earmarked sources.  * Is there an agency competent to carry out
Governments often circumvent the intentions of  the program and appropriate accounting and au-
earmarking by withholding funds or failing to  diting to guard against abuse?
change prices or taxes or, if need be, simply
susF-"nding  the earmarking arrangements.  These  * Is there a cutoff date for deciding whether
problems, and the failure to provide an appropri-  the earmarking arrangements should be contin-
ate balance between recurrent and capital  ued?
This paper is a product of the Public Economics Division, Country Economics
Department.  Copies are available free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW,
Washington DC 20433. Please contact Ann Bhalla,  room N 10-059,  extension 60359
(43 pages with tables).
The PPR Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work under way in the Bank's Policy, Planning, and Research 
IComplex. An objective of the series is to get these findings out quickly, even if presentations are less than fully polished.
|The  findings, interpretations, and cenclusions in these papers do not necessarily represent of  ficial policy of the Bank.
Produced at the PPR Dissernination CenterTAIL!  01CONTNTS
PART  I:  PRINCIPLES  OF EARMARKING  .....................................  1
A.  Background  ...........................................  1
B.  The Case  AgainMt  Earmarking  .........  ...................  4
C.  The  Case  For  Earmarking  .................................  7
D.  The Earmarking  Problem: The  Search  for  an  Efficient
Automatic  Pricing  Mechanism  ..........................  13
PART  II:  SELECTED  EXANPLES  OF  WORLD  BANK  EXPERIENCE  VITH  EANRARKING..  21
A.  Highway  Funds ...........  .....................  21
B.  Earmarking  at the  Local  Government  Level:
The  Example  of  Colombia's  Valorization  Tax  ............  25
C.  Two  Countries  with  Widespread  Earmarking:  Turkey
and  Colombia  ........................  29
PART  III: CONCLUSIONS  AND  RECOMMENDATIONS  ............................  38
BIBLIOGRAPHY .........................................  42PART  I:  PRINCIPUCS  0  SKRNAJIIa
A.  Backgrosd
1.  Earmarking  is the practice  of assigning  revenues  from speclfic
taxes  or groups  of taxes  to specific  government  activities  or to broader
areas of government  activity.  As such, it contrasts  with general  fund
financing where monies are pooled to be used for various government
purposes. In practice,  e-armarking  has come into  being  via statute  or via
constitutional  clawues  mandating  that certain  revenues  only be used for
specified activities.  The rules of the game may in some cases allow
earmarked  funds  to  be supplemented  by revenues  from  other  sources  or allow
earnarked  funds  to be diverted  to other  uses.  The distinguishing  feature
of earmarking,  at least in its pure form, is the desire to protect  a
certain  category  of expenditures  from  the  vagaries  of the  political  process
by  linking them to a particular revenue source.  Once this link is
established,  the  system  supposedly  runs  on automatic  pilot  and  the  behavior
of revenues  over  time  drives  the  level  of expenditures.
2.  At first glance,  earmarking  appears  to be an application  of the
benefit  principle  of taxation  --  that is, the  beneficiaries  or recipients
of certain  government  activities  are  the  ones  paying  the  taxes  or charges.
Despite  the apparent  connection,  however,  it is possible  to have benefit
taxation  or earmarking  without  the other.  Benefit  taxes  may be added  to
the central pool or revenues  may be earmarked  for activities  which do
nothing  for  the  contributing  taxpayers. 1
1/  For a useful review of the benefit principle of taxation and its
relation  to questions  of efficiency  and equity,  see R.M. Bird,  *A New
Look at Bevdfit  Taxation'  in H.C. Recktenwald  (ed.)  Tendances  a Long
Terme  du Secteur  Public:  Secular  Trends  of the  Ppblic  Sector  241 (Paris:
Editions  Cujas,  1978),  pp.  241-252.-2-
3.  Four  broad  types  of  earmarking,  categorized  by  the  degree  of
apecificity  of  tax  source  or  expenditures  financed,  are  shown  in  Table  1.
The  most  common  forms  are  gasolLne  taxes/motor  vehicle  fees  for  highway
expenditures  and employer/employee  contributions  to social  security  and
unemployment  insurance  fund.  Revenue  sharing  between  various  levels  of
government  is  also  common.  A subcategory  of  Type  A forms  what  we  will  call
"strong  earmarking",  the  case  where  there  is  a  benefit  link  between  the
charges  assessed  and the  goods/services  provided.  These  are  cases  where
the  goods/services  involved  have  the  characteristics  of private  goods  --
little  or  no  externalities,  no  claim  by  recipients  for  special  treatment  on
income  distribution  grounds,  and  no significant  inefficiencies  resulting
from  the  implementation  of  a charge. 2 Trausactions  in  these  goods  give
off  market  signals  regarding  the  amounts  desired  and  willingness  to  pay.
It  is  also  worth  noting  that  public  enterprises  --  to  the  extent  that  they
are  allowed  to  retain  control  over  profits  --  represent  a form  of  strong
earmarking;  the  purity  of  each  case  would  depend  on  their  independence  from
the  budget  for  subsidies  or  other  special  financing  arrangements.
4.  The  remaining  cases  of Type  A and  Types  B-D  in  Table  1 are  all
examples  of "weaker"  earmarking  in that  the  connection  between  assessees
and  beneficiaries  is  tenuous  or  non-existent  and  there  are  redistribution
or other  social  welfare  objectives  comingled  with  allocative  objectives.
The designation  of a liquor  tax for the financing  of education,  for
Z/  Actually,  "strong  earmarking'  could  be  extended  to  public  goods  as  well
provided  a way could  be found to induce  people  to reveal  their
preferences  about  what  they  would  be willing  to pay for  alternative
amounts  of  the  good,  hence  allowing  a decision  to  be reached  about  the
optimum  quantity  to  be provided  and  the  division  of  the  tax  bill  for
that  quantity  among  citizens  according  to  their  preferences.-3-
~3J~:  VARIETIES OF!  FARXAR.KING
I=D  Revenue  EUDLnditure  Examnles
A  Specific  Tax  Specific  End-use  *  Gasoline  taxes/
or Fee  motor  vehicle  fees  for
highway  investments
*  Social  Security,
Unemployment  funds
*  Public  enterprises
B  Specific  Tax  Broad  End-use  *  Lottery  proceeds  and
or Fee  sin  taxes  (tobacco,
alcohol)  to finance
social  sector  programs
* Taxes/royalties  from
petroleum  to finance
development  expenditure
c  General  Tax  Specific  End-use  Fixed  % of total
revenue  devoted  to
specific  programs
(e.g.  education)
*  Revenue  sharing  for  a
specific  purpose
D  General  Tax  General  End-use  *  Revenue  sharing
example,  gives us no useful information  about the appropriate  level of
education and represents a  straight transfer between two groups of
citizens.  Similarly for the earmarking of a  fixed (and arbitrary)
percentage of general revenues for education.  All of the cases of
earmarking  can  be diluted  by the  possibilities  for  supplementary  funds  from
general  revenue  or diversion  of earmarked  funds to other  uses.  In such
instances,  it is  not clear  what role  earmarking  is playing  since  decisions
about the relative  merits of using funds on the earmarked  expenditure
versus  other  government  expenditures  appear  to  be dictating  the  allocation
of resources  at the  margin.-4-
5.  In  the  remainder  of  this  paper,  we  will  concentrate  our  attention
on those  cases  of earmarking  involving  the  provision  of firly specific
goods  or  services  financed  by  a  clearly  designated  tax  or  fee  (that  is,
categories  A  and B in Table  1).  Even  here,  to  make the discussion
reasonably  tractable,  we will  ignore  social  security,  public  enterprises,
and  the  sharing  of  revenues  between  levels  of  government,  all  of  which  are
special  cases of earmarking. The remainder  of the paper  takes  the
following  shape.  Sections  B  and  C  sketch  out  the  cases  against  and  for
earmarking  as  they  have  appeared  in  the  literature.  Section  D  takes  up  the
question  of whether  rules  can be developed  for price/tax  setting  and
expenditure  of  the  proceeds  for  earmarked  goods  and,  if  so,  whether  such
rules  appear  to  lead  to  desirable  consequences.  The section  also  takes  up
the  question  of  whether  earmarking  is  justified  in  those  cases  where  there
is  little  or  no. connection  between  the  beneficiaries  of  public  expenditures
tax/price  payers.  Part  II  summarizes  the  lessons  that  can  be  learned  from
several  prominent  cases  of  earmarking  with  which  the  World  Bank  has  had
experience:  highway  funds,  betterment  taxes  to  finance  local  expenditures,
and  Turkey  and  Colombia  where  earmarking  has  become  extensive.  Part  III
draws  some  preliminary  conclusions  and  suggests  some  criteria  which
earmarked  funds  should  meet.
B.  The Cas'  Against  Earmarking
6.  Among economists  and  public  administrators,  earr  rking  has  but  a
few  supporters.  The  case  against  is  well  known and  can  be  stated  quite
briefly.  The usual  litany  of  objections  contains  the  following  items: 3
I/  The  list  is  from  Elizabeth  Deran  'EarmarkLng  and  Expenditures:  A Survey
and  a  New Test',  National  Tax  Journal  (December  1965),  pp.  354-61,  but
&imilar  remarks  have  been  made in  a  number of  places.-5-
0  It leads  to  a  misallocation  of resources,  with  too  much  being
given  to earmarked  activities  and  not  enough  to others;
o  It  hampers  effective  budgetary  control,  to  a  degree  depending
on whether  provisions  are  eab.'-ded  in statutes  or in the
constitution;
o  It  infringes  on  the  powers  and  discretion  of  the  legislative
and  executive  branches  of  government;
o  It imparts  inflexibility  into  budgets  in tb  .; changes  only
come  with  a lag  and  earmarking  systems  continue  after  their
usefulness  has  been  served.
7.  The litany  boils  down to saying  that  earmarking  reduces
discretion;  by reducing  the scope of the executive/legislative
branches'  command  over  the  allocation  of resources,  it  builds  some
rigidity into the system and reduces flexibility. Earmarked
expenditures  are  exempted  from  swings  in  the  availability  of  general
resources;  in timen  of general  resource  shortages,  too  much  will  be
devoted  to  the  earmarked  areas  compared  to  a  situation  where  they  had
to  compete  with  other  uses  (provided,  of  course  that  earmarked  funding
sources  are more stable  than general  revenues).  In addition,
earmarking  has  been  criticized  because  it  removes  expenditures  from
close  public  scrutiny.  Earmarked  expenditures  may  not  have  to  meet
the same rigorous  evaluation  as other  budgetary  expenditures,  and
hence  funds  may  be  diverted  to  low  priority  projects  or  squandered  in
needless  overheads  (e.b.,  elaborate  buildings,  overstaffing).6-
8.  Clearly,  the  foregoing  arguments  have some  merit. At a  very
minimum,  they  would  lead  one  to  conclude  that  expenditure  of  earmarkLd
money should  be subject  to established,  clear  evaluation  procedures
and  to strict accounting/auditing to assure that funds are not
diverted  from stated  purposes  and that  each  earmarked  fund  should  be
subject  to  periodic  reviAw  as to the  desirability  of its  continuation.
Nonetheless,  it is hard to make a case against  earmarking  under  all
circumstances.  The  defects  cited  by its  critics  are  the  virtues  cited
by its  proponents  who argue  that  there  are  circumstances  under  which
limitations on  the possibilities for reallocating  resources and
rigidity  are in fact  desirable. Moreover,  the  flexibility  of general
fund financing  can be overstated. Monies  are  not readily  moved  from
one  expenditure  category  to another  as expenditures  for  debt  service,
social insurance, and oftimes administration and  security 'take
precedence  and expenditure  programs,  once  started,  take  on a life  of
their own.  In some cases,  countries  have established  very strict
control  procedures  to guard  against  corruption  or the  misuse  of funds,
safeguards so strict that it is difficult to begin expenditure
programs  or to obtain  timely  funding  for them  once  approved.  In such
cases, earmarking is an escape from overly rigid general budget
procedures. 4 The  existence  of numerous  in-stances  of  earmarking  in the
i/ For example,  see R.N. Bird "Budgeting  and Expenditure  Control  in
Colombia",  Public  Budgeting  and  Finance,  (Autumn  1982)  Vol.  2, No.
3,  pp. 87-99.-7-
real  world  --  an.  the  fact  that  at  least  some  appear  to  be successful 5
--  would  argue  tbat  we  should  explore  further  why  this  should  be  so.
C.  The Case  For  Karmarkiny
9.  Adherents  of  earmarking  --  few  as  they  are  --  cite  a  number
of  advantages: 6
o  It applies  the  benefit  principle  of taxation  (at  least  in
some  cases).
o  It  provides  greater  assurances  of  minimum  levels  of  financing
for  public  services  that  governments  consider  worthy,  thus
avoiding  periodic  haggling  within  the  bureaucracy  or  between
the  bureaucracy  and legislature  over  appropriate  levels  of
funding.
o  Greater  stability  and  continuity  of  funding  may  lead  to  lower
costs  through  speedy  completion.
o  By linking  taxation  with expenditures,  it may overcome
resistance  to taxes  and help to generate  new sources  of
revenue.
l/  However,  many  of  the  instances  where  earmarking  appears  appropriate
both oa  theoretical grounds and on the basis of broadly
satisfactory  performance  are clustered  in the  areas  of revenue
sharing  between  various  levels  of  government  and  social  security.
There is a reasonable  consensus  that revenue  sharing  may be
justified  by mismatches  in the efficient  decentralization  of
revenue  raising  and  expenditure  activities,  externalities  in  local
government  expenditures,  and  income  redistribution  considerations.
Similarly  the financing  of social  security  programs  through
earmarked  taxes  on earnings  (whether  paid by the employee  or
employer)  can  be justified  by the  obvious  benefit  nature  of the
relationshir  and by the fact  that  in most  LDCs  coverage  is so
narrow  that  financing  from  general  taxation  would  likely  involve  a
transfer  to  a  relatively  better  off  segment  of  the  population.
i  The  list  is  again  from  E.  Deran,  2  Si$ p.  357.10.  To the  extent  there  is  overlap,  earmarking  takes  on some  of
the  same vlrtues  as  benefit  taxation  --  l.e.  the  simultaneous  linking
of the expenditure  and revenue  sides  of the  budget;  the  provision  of
adequate  financing  for  public  goods  and services;  and  the  elimination
of excess  demand/shortages  that  occur  when  goode/services  are  provided
below (marginal)  cost or free.  That is,  the virtues of benefit
taxation  are similar  to those  of the price mechanism:  it provides
appropriate  signals for the efficient  allocation  of resources  and
financing  for  government  services.
11.  The  possibil. .y of  a  linkage between  expenditure and
tax/prlce  decisions  forms  an important  thread  in the  long  search  for  a
fair or just system  of taxation,  a thread  that stretches  from Adam
Saith through  Wicksell  and Lindahil  down to Samuelson,  Musgrave  and
Buchanan. 7 A fair tax system,  it is said,  would be one in which
people  paid according  to what they received,  and taxes  would  be set
according  to  the  marginal  benefits  received  by  taxpayers.
Expenditures  --  both in total and for individual  public goods and
services --  would be expanded  so long as at the margin benefits
received  by all individuals  exceeded  marginal  costs.  Thus the total
1/ See  Knut  Wicksell,  'A  New  Principle  of  st  Taxation";  Erik  Lindahl
aJust Taxation - A  Positive Solution"  and "Some Controversial
Questions  in the Theory  of Taxation",  in R.A. Musgrave  and A.T.
Peacock  (eds),  Classics  in the  Theory  of Public  Finance  (MacMillan
&  Co.,  London, 1958), pp.  72-118, 168-76, a8d 214-32; P.A.
Samuelson,  "The  Pure  Theory  of Public  ExpendLtures  Review  ofg
Egonomigs and Statistics (November 1954) pp.  387-389 and *A
Diagramotic Exposition  of a Theory  of Public  Expenditures  Ravie
of  Economics  and  Statistics  (November  1955),  pp.  350-56;
R.A.  Musgrave  The Theory  of Public  Finance  (McGraw-Hill,  Inc.,  New
York 1959),  Chapter  4; J.M. Buchanan,  The  Demand  and Sunly  of
Public  Goods  (Rand  McNally  & Co.,  Chicago,  1968).-9-
level  of  expendltures  (and  its  eoposition),  the  total  level  of  taxes
and  Its distributLon  ac  os  taxpayers would be determined
simultaneously.  As elegant  as  such  a  system  would  appear  In  theory,
it-  design  in  practice  has  proved  to  be  another  matter  since  it  leaves
open the problem  of how to handle  taxes/expenditures  that  have
distrLbutional  objectives  (i.e.,  how to finance  the  redistribution)
and  how  to  induce  the  public  to  reveal  its  preferences  in  the  case  of
pure  public  goods  --  especially  if  it  knows  that  such  revelations  will
be the  basis  for  Lncreased  tax  bills. 8 Nonetheless,  this  strand  of
public  finance  theory  points  up the importance  of thinking  about
expendlture  end tax/financing  questions  together  and the  fact  that
this  linkage  is  essential  to  arriving  at  correct  resource  allocation
decisions.  Indeed,  the  "public  choice  economistsu  (i.e.  Buchanan  and
Co.)  would  argue  that  there  are  cases  where  the  linkage  is  essential
to  reaching  any  collective  decision  to  expand  the  size  of  government
activity.
12.  *  The criticisms  of earmarking  rest  mainly  on a notion  of
government  as  a single  will  or  government  decisionmaking  as  a  perfect
reflection  of  the wishes  of  the population  under  which
3/  To  some  extent,  the  budgetary  process  may  be  thought  of  as  a  method
of inducing  a kind of quasi-preference  revelation. Elected
officials  must  be sensitive  to  voter  desires  and  voters  know  that
they  will be taxed  to finance  the  expansion  of any government
activity  only if other  voters  are likewise  taxed.  However,
knowledge of voter desires  --  especially  as to the amounts  and
quality  of  public  goods  and  services  to  be  provided  --  is  at  best
imperfect  and,  given  larger  numbers,  voters  know  that  they
individually  can  obtain  a  free  ride. That  is,  its  not  at  all  clear
how  accurately  the  budgetary  process  translates  the  public's  wishes
into  concrete  expenditure  and  tax  programs.
a.-- 10
expendlture/taxadton  declsions  are  made such  aa to  maxLize some (even
if implicit) social welfare function.  Analogously  to household
utility  maxlmizatlon,  lf  allocatlve  choices  are  made  such  that  the  net
marginal  social  beneflts  are  equated,  any  constraLnts  on choice  would
lead to a lower  level  of welfare.  If,  on the  other  hand,  one drops
the notlon  of a single  will and recognizes  that political  processes
are  lmperfect  and  that  societLes  consist  of  many  groups  with  differlng
preferences,  benefit  taxatLon/earmarkLng  may take  on a more favorable
coloring  as a means  of accommodatLirg  differences  at a polnt ln tioe
and over time. 9 If collective  decisions  are  nothlng  more than the
expression of individual  choices through constitutionally  agreed
rules,  general  fund financing  may have its limlts. Expenditures  and
taxes  are  considered  separately, with  the  level of  (planned)
expenditures  determined annually at budget tlme on the basis of
projected revenue from a  tax system that has been  implemented
piecemeal  over  a  number  of  years. The  orly  links  between  expenditures
and taxation  in thls process  are the marginal  adjustments  in either
that must be  made  to accommodate macroeconomic  stabilization
considerations.
13.  These  characteristics  of genera.  fund  financing,  coupled  with
unstable majority coalitions,  mistrus, among competing  groups,  or
general "tax weariness"  may make it 4  fficult  to raise additional
resources.  Voter/legislators  will  be u  illing  to  vote for  more taxes
2/  In fact,  if  voters  have identical  preferences  2;  if the  same  voter
group  had the  median  preferences  with respect  to both expenditure
composition  and taxation  (budget  size) then the solutions  under
general  fund  financing  and  earmarking  are  the  same.- 11  -
without  asswrances  about  how the money  will be spent  or to vote for
more  expenditures  without  the  details  about  how the  tax  burden  will  be
distributed.  Without  assurances  about  both  sides  of the  equation  and
some  guarantee  that  agreements  will  be honored,  it  may  not  be possible
to  obtain  a  majority  of  voters/legislators  in  favor  of a change. Both
Buchanan and Goetz have shown that earmarking  enforces  a 'tie-in"
which ensures  that taxes  will be used for  certain  purposes  and that
the relationship  will be stable through  time.1 0 Thus, there are
circumstances  under  which  earmarking  would  break through  the impasse
and allow money to be raised that otherwise  might not have been
possible.11
14.  Earmarking  has  also  been  viewed  as strengthening  the  case  for
cost  recovery  in the  case of goods/services  where  charging  a prize  is
feasible. Cost recovery,  the argument  goes,  makes  more sense  if the
monies  raised  are retained  for  particular  public  goods  or nervices  in
the  sector. 12 Beneficiaries  will  be more  willing  to  pay if  they  know
IV/  J.M. Buchanan, "The Economics of Earmarked  Taxess Journal of
Political  Economy  (Ocrober  1963),  71,  pp.  457-69;  and  C.J.  Goetz,
"Earmarked  Taxes  and  the  Majority  Rule  Budgetary  Process"  Amrican
Economic  Review  (March  1968),  pp. 128-136.
JJ  In  Buchanan  and  Goetz's  scheme  of things,  the  impasse  results  when
the  majority  in favor  of a given  expenditure  (tax)  program  feels
that its  preferred  tax  (expenditure)  program  will  not  be adopted.
With expenditure  and tax decisions  made separately,  the decision
to do nothing  may be the only  one which  can command  a majority.
However,  such  an impasse  can  be broken  if there  are combinations
of expenditures  and tax finance  which a majority  would favor.
This is not to say  that the  change  brought  about  will  be "Pareto
optimal".  The decision  needs only a majority  vote and clearly
some  persons  could  be hurt  by the  change.
2/  Obviously earmarking  is not essential  to cost recovery.  Cost
recovery  - - with the  funds  flowing  to the  central  pool - - can  be
justified  by the  need for  the  public  sector  to mobilize  resources
generally and  by  the  contributions of benefit taxation to
efficiency  and  equity.- 12 -
their  monies  will be used for activities  that  directly  benefit  them.
Officials,  involved  in the  provision  of a particular  good  or service,
will  be  more  willing  to  enforce  fee  collectior  if they  know that  their
clients  will be benefited  and/or  the  quality  or quantity  of services
provided  by their sector  will be enhanced.  Hence, earmarking  may
contribute  to improved collection  performance,  and perhaps  even a
better  utilization  of the monies  since  concerned  users  and  officials
are better  monitors  ot performance  than  more distant  authorities. 13
In addition --  and this argument likely  applies  better to public
enterprises than to government departments and  agencies  - the
knowledge  that the size of the institution's  investment  program  is
directly  related  to the  amount  of self-finance  it can  generate  may in
some cases  be a spur toward  greater  production  efficiency. In sum,
the above arguments  point to earmarking  as a means to improve  the
performance  of  public  sector  institutions.  The arguments  make sense,
but  whether  they  hold  up  as  a  general  rule  can  only  be  determined  by
an  examination  of  real  world  experience.
15.  Paragraphs  9-14  summarize  the  general  case  for  earmarking.
It  appears  that,  under  certain  circumstances,  the  practice  may help
achieve  improvements  in  the  allocation  of  resources  that  would  not
have been possible  under  general  fund finance  and/or  it may  be a way
w/  For  example,  a  recent  study  of the  Philippines  showed  that  schools
that rely more heavily on local sources  of finance  have lower
costs,  holding  enrollments  and  quality  variables  constant. See  S.
Jimenez, V. Paqueo, and L. deVera, Does Local FinancingMiake
Primary  Schools  More Efficient? The  Philippines  Case (World  Bank
Working  Paper  Series,  WPS 69,  August  1988).- 13
around  general  budgetary  procedures  that are  cumbersome  and
inflexible. The arguments  clearly  have some merit  but they are  not
compelling  in that they do not give us a clear indlcation  of the
circumstances  under  whlch  earmarklng  is justifLed  or the  criteria  it
would  have to meet to be considered  satisfactory. We take up these
questions  in  the  next  section.
D.  The  Earmarkinug  Problem: The  Search  for  an Efficient.  Automatic
prLcing  Mechanism
16.  Neither the theoretical  nor the practical  literature  gives
much  guidance  about  what  performance  criteria  edrmarking  would  have  to
meet to be considered satisfactory.  The theoretical  aspects  are
limited  to deriving  circumstances  under  which earmarking  might  prove
to be  desirable.  Little is said about how earmarking  might be
implemented  in practice  or what might determine  whether earmarking
arrangements  were suitable  or  not. The  practical  literature  evaluates
the experience  of earmarking  in various  countries  or sectors,  using
broad  criteria  about :he  growth  and  mix  of earmarked  expenditures.  On
the  basis  of such  qualitative  criteria,  earmarking  usually  receives  a
mixed  to  negatlve  rating.
17.  In this section,  we will argue  that  earmarking  arrangements
must  meet two  broad  criteria. First,  the  price/tax  arrangements  must
be such that they lead  to an appropriate  allocation  of resources  for
the sector.  That is, the financing  must lead to an economically
efficient  result.  Secondly,  the price/tax  arrangements  must lead to
reasonably  automatic  finan^-ing  for  the  earmarked  expenditures  --  that
is,  financing  that  is  independent  of  general  budget  developments.  If- 14  -
earmarked  funds  must depend  on frequent  executive/legislative  branch
decisions  about  prices/taxes  (or  on additional  funds  from  the  general
budget), then they are no longer  insulated  and begin to take the
characteristic_.  of general  fund  financing. In the  remainder  of this
section,  we will sketch  in  more  details  on the  efficiency  conditions,
emphasizing  that  according  to economic  theory,  price/tax  arrangements
would  both meet efficiency  criteris  and insulate  the earmarked  fund
from the budget  only under restrictive assumptLons  and that in
practice  governments  find ways around  the insulation. The section
concludes  with  an argument  against  earmarking  when there  is little  or
not  overlap  between  beneficiaries  and  price/tax  payors.
18.  The traditional  theory  of earmarking  has been laid out in
terms of balanced budgets --  charges paid by beneficiaries/taxpayers
will be just sufficient  to cover the (current  and capital)  cost of
providing  the good or service.  For example,  in Samuelson's  general
equilibrium  model of the efficient  provision  of private  and social
goods,'  all goods are provided  under constant  returns  to scale,  the
quantity  of each social  good consumed  is the same for all taxpayers
(by definition)  and its output  expanded  so long as the sum of the
marginal  benefits  over all taxpayers  exceeds  the (constant)  marginal
cost of its provision. 1 4  The equilibrium  solution involves the
J  This,  of course,  abstracts  from  the "free  rider"  problem. If all
public  goods  must  be consumed  in equal  quantities  by all  and one
person's  participation  in  the  benefits  of any  public  good  does  not
affect  the benefits received by others, then there are no
incentives  for taxpayers  to reveal  their  preferences,  esp. when
large  numbers  are  involved. They beneftt  whether  they  pay  or  not.- 15  -
determination  of  quantities  of  all  public  and  private  goods,  taxes
levied  on each  taxpayor  for  each  soclal  good  according  to the  marginal
benefit  that he receives,  and the  sun of taxes  paLd for  each social
good equal  to the  total  cost of supplying  that good.  Although  there
is  no earmarking  in the  sense  of segregated  funds,  earmarking  in  fact
takes  place  bocause  every  public  expenditure  comes  with its  own  source
of  finance and  no public good would be provided without such
financing.  With constant  returns,  the budget for each public  good
would  be balanced.
19.  Analogous  is the case of the public  sector  providing  pure
private  goods  under  conditions  of  constant  returns  to scale
(abstracting  for  a moment  from questions  of  scale  economies
indivisibilities,  externalities,  or  public  sector  financial
constraints). Given the level  of demand  for the good, the optimum
output involves the equality of price with short- and long-run
marginal  cost (and  hence  with short-  and long-run  average  costs). A
price in excess  of short-run  marginal  cost provides  an incentive  to
increase  production  using  variable  factors  of  production  while  a  price
in  excess  of long-run  marginal  cost  would  lead  to  increased  investment
to expand  capacity  and lower (short-run)  costs of production. The
optimally  adjusted capacity, for a given demand, involves the
equalities  listed  above  and  results  in total  revenues  equalling  total
costs.  Earmarking  (and  cost recovery)  would in this case involve  a
balanced  budget.  This  would  not  be so,  however,  if capacity  had not16  -
been  adjusted  to  the  optimum  levell 5 or  if  some of  our  assumptions
were  altered. 16
20.  Without  the  assumptions  llsted  at  the  beginning  of  paragraph
19,  economic  optima  and  earmarking  would  need  to  involve  unbalanced
budgets.  Put  differently,  any  earmarking  rule  that  required  a
balanced  budget  would  violate  optimality  conditions.  The  reasons  why
this  is  so  are  well  known  and  need  only  be  outlined  here.
Returns  to  Scale.  With  increasing  (decreasing)  returns  to
scale,  the  long-run  optimal  output  stlll  involves  the
equality  of  price  with  short-  and  long-run  marginal  cost,
both  of  which  fall  short  of  (exceed)  short-  and  long-run
average  costs.  That  is,  optimal  adjustment  to  any  given
level  of  demand  will  involve  continuous  losses  (profits)  for
an  indefinite  period.
IndivLsibilities.  With  constant  returns  to  scale  but  with
lumpy investments  which  add  non-marginal  increments  to
output,  the  output  at  which  price  is  equal  to  both  short-  and
long-run  marginal  cost  --  for  any  given  level  of  demand  --
JV  All  short-term  equilibria  (with  short-run  marginal  cost  unequal  to
long-run  marginal  cost)  involve  either  excess  profits  or  losses.
J/  The  results  still  hold  in  the  face  of  fluctuating  demand,  keeping
the  assumptions  of  constant  returns  and  no indivisibilities.  In
the  so-called  "peak  load  pricing'  case,  non-peak  users  pay  a  price
equal  to  short-run  marginal  cost  while  peak  users  pay  a  price
sufficient  to  cover  the  variable  and  fixed  costs  of  peak  use.
Optimality  thus  involves  a  balanced  budget.  See  O.E.  Williamson,
'Peak  Load  Pricing  and  Optimal  Capacity  under  Indivisibility
Constraints",  American  Economics  Review,  56  (September  1966),  pp.
810-827.- 17  -
may  be  iLpossible  to  attain,  and  the  appropriate  price  will
elther  exceed  or fall  short  of long-run  marginal  cost  and
lnvolve  coutinuous  excess  profits  or  losses.
terDnlities  Optimization  in  the  presence  of  externalities
Lnvolves  equallty  between  marginal  social  bonefits  and
marginal  social  costs. With the  good/service  in question
produced  under  constant  returns  to  scale.  external  economies
involve  a  higher  output  than  would  be  generated  by  private
demand and  supply  conslderations  snd  a  subsidy  to  consumers
to  induce  then  to  consume  the  larger  quantity.  External
diseconomies  in  turn  would  involve  a  tax  on  output  which
results  in  a  lover  equilibrium  output  than  would be  generated
by  private  demand-supply  considerations.
Public  Sector  Financial  Constraints  (pure  taxation).  The
government's  desire  to raise  revenue  to finance  general
public  sector  operations  may  lead  to  use  of  excise  and  sales
taxes  (as  well  as  pricing  of public  enterprise  products  at
above marginal cost) --  i.e , financial constraints  may
dictate  indirect  taxation  which  drives  a wedge  between  the
price  consumers  pay and  marginal  (private  and  social)  costs. 17
Any monies  raised  in this  fashion  belong  to the general
budget.
Efficiency  considerations  dictate  that  the tax/pricing  decision
for all goods  and services--private  and public--be  considered
togAther in order to minimize distortionary  costs.  The
discrepancy  between  price  and  marginal  cost  should  be relatively
higher  on  goods  where  the  ratio  of  marginal  revenue  gain  to  the
marginal  distortionary  cost  is relatively  high  and  conversely,
optimality  being  reached  when  the  ratio  is  the  same  for  all  goods.- 18  -
21.  The above sketches  a number  of examples  when economic  efficiency
and earmarking  considerations  would appear  to requirs  inequality  between
revenues  and  outlays  for  variable  and  fixed  factors  of  production  and  hence
some sort of relationship with the general budget  (or perhaps with
financial  markets  should  borrowing  or lending  be allowed). Quite simply
put, allowing  expenditure  levels  In these  cases  to  be driven  solely  by the
level  of earmarked  revenues  would lead to a misallocation  of resources.
For  example,  the  excess  profits  generated  at the  optimum  level  of output  in
the increasing  costs  case  are not a signal  for increased  investment  since
capacity  is  already  correct;  the  excess  profits  should  either  revert  to the
general  budget  or, at a minimum,  be held in interest  bearing financial
assets  until  increased  real investment  could  be justified. Similarly,  the
losses  dictated  by optimality  considerations  in the cases of decreasing
costs  gL positive  externalities  would  have to be met from general  funds.
In thcory,  therefore,  there are a large number  cases in which economic
efficiency  would  dictate  an unbalanced  budget  and in  which,  therefore,  it
would  be undesirable  to  run  a fund  independently  from  the  general  budget.
22.  Theoretical  considerations aside, experience has  shown  that
automatic financing arrangements  are difficult to devise in practice.
There  are  a  number  of reasons  why the  Isolation  of  earmarked  funds  from  the
general  budget  is  difricult  to achieve. Tne first  is the  obvious  one  that
often such funds also depend on additional,  non-earmarked  sources of
revenue. In such  cases,  the  amount  of such  monies  will  depend  upon  general
budget considerations  (for example,  the availability  of resources.  the
comparative  desirability  of  various  expenditures)  and it  is  no longer  clear
what role earmarking  may be having  on the allocation  of resources  at the
margin.  Second,  earmarked  revenues  are easily  eroded,  especially  in an- 19  -
inflationary  environment. To t'na  extent  that any fund is dependent  on a
specific  tax, an administered  price,  or an ad valorem  tax linked  to an
administered price,  it is dependent  on periodic  government  price
adjustments. By failure  to adjust,  the  Government  can force  the fund to
become more dependent  on general  budget finance  and/or  give itself  the
leeway  to raise  other  taxes. Thirdly,  experience  has shown  that  government
will simply  override  earmarking  arrangements  if necessity  dictates  (see
paragraph  28,  for  example,  for  the  experience  of  highways).
23.  Up to this point,  we have confined  our attention  to earmarking
cases  which  have a strong  benefit  link --  a large,  if not total,  overlap
between  the tax/price-payers  and the  expenditure  beneficiaries. A  number
of real  world  cases,  however,  do not  meet  this  condition: e.g.  the  use of
so-called  sin taxes  (alcohol,  tobacco),  or lottery  proceeds  to finance  the
social  sectors,  the  setting  aside  of a fixed  proportion  of income  taxes  for
specific  purposes, and the like.  These cases seem to have almost  no
redeeming features. 18 There's no connection  between the amount of
reventes raised and the appropriate  level  of expenditures  or services;
indeed,  because  the  goods/services  are  provided  to  users  below  cost,  there
is a  tendency  toward  excess  demand,  necessitating  the use of non-price
devices (e.g. queuing, congestion,  entrance  examinations)  to restrain
demand.  In addition,  since in most of these  cases earmarked  funds  are
supplemented  by general  budget  funds,  the  real  function  that  earmarking  is
jf/ Indeed  it is not clear  that  they  would  be justified  even in the  event
of greater  overlap  between  tax/price-payers  and  beneficiaries.  If,  for
example, a substantial  number  of students  (or their families)  were
smokers  or drinkers,  it does not follow  that taxation  of tobacco  and
alcohol would generate the appropriate  level of resources  for the
education  sector.20  -
playing  is not  clear.  Earmarked  sources  are  supplylng  an arbitrary  amount
of  resources  for  the  sector;  the  addltional  amount  of resources  coming  from
the  general  fund  depends  on the needs  of the sector  as agaLnst  those  of
other  sectors.  The  main  virtue  touted  by  proponents  of  these  taxes  Ls  that
government  can  extract  more  resources  from  taxpayers  by  committing  then  to
specific  purposes.  However,  given  fungibillty  and  given  that  earmarking
cannot  play much  of a role  toward  assuring  the  appropriate  level  of output
in such  cases,  such  commitments  appear  to serve  political  ends  rather  than
being  rooted  in  sound  efficiency/distributional  crlteria.21 -
PART  II:  IELECTED  S  OF  0  Q=OLD  K  EXPERENCE
24.  The highways sector is a particularly  fruitful  one for study.
Firstly,  it has a  number  of characteristics  which  make it interesting  from
the point of view of pricing and cost recovery  decisions  --  e.g. the
presence of returns to scale and indivisibility questions,  external
diseconomies  in the form of congestion  and pollution,  and income  elastic
demand for fuel which  opens up the possibility of luxury taxation.
Secondly, taxes on fuel and vehicles form a  significant  fraction  of
government  revenues  in  both developed  and less  developed  countries  and in
both  there  are  numerous  examples  of  earmarking  in  the  form  of  highway
funds.  This  section  begins  by  briefly  reviewing  the  evolution  of  the
Bank's  attitude  toward  earmarking  and  then  summarizes  the  Bank's  experience
with  a  number  of  road  funds  in  developing  countries.
25.  After  an initial  period  of enthusiasm,  the  Bank's  attitude  toward
earmarking  for highway expenditure  has cooled  considerably.  Early Bank
work  --  at least for some specific countries --  called for earmarking on
the argument that greater stability in funding would p.rovide  steadier
support  for the development  of entrepreneurship  and woul- help to lover
unit construction  costs by speeding  completion;  in addition,  some crude
statistical  work  purpo.ted  to show  a correlation  between  earmarking  and  the
proportion  of investment  devoted  to highways.l 9 Later  Bank  work  has been
more skeptical.  The Bank's Transportation  Policy  Note No. 1 (1985)20
12/  P. Eklund,  Earmarking  of Taxes for Highways  in Developing  Countries
(IBRD;  Economics  Department  Working  Paper  No.  1; June  6, 1967).
ZQ/  IBRD,  Interim Guiv'elines - Road  Funds  from  Earmarked  Sources
(Transportation  Note  No. 1;  November  5, 1985).22  -
stated  that  the  Bank's  experience  with  road  funds  had  been  poor  almost
without  exception  and  concluded  that,  with  some  qualifications,  earmarking
ought  to  be  avoided  wherever  possible.  The  qualifications  recognized  that
where  public  sector  mismanagement  was  rampant  the  alternative  to  earmarking
might  be worse  and  allowed  for  earmarking  where  (a)  there  was a public
agency  with  the  demonstrated  capacity  to  carry  out  the  program;  (b)  funds
would be devoted entirely  to a maintenance  program  where economic
priorities  had  been  carefully  articulated;  (c)  there  were  clear  controls
(ex  ante and ex post) against  the diversion  of funds;  and (d) the
earmarking  arrangement  would  be  of  finite  duration.
26.  The  Bank's  position  is  based  on  the  by  and  large  poor  performance
of earmarking  for  highways  in LDCs.  In its  qualifications,  it clearly
recognizes  the  importance  of  institutional  capacity  and  the  existence  of  a
priority  expenditure  program  based  on  economic  criteria;  there  is  no  way
that  earmarking  can  make  up for  their  absence. It  also  recognizes  that
commitments  to  earmarking  ought  not  to  be  open-ended;  there  ought  to  be
periodic  evaluations  to  determine  whether  contiruation  is  justified  on  the
basis  of  past  performance  and  likely  future  needs.  Nonetheless,  the  Bank's
qualified  position  still raises  questions.  Even  acknowledging  that
inadequacy  of  maintenance  funds  is  a general  problem  in  LDCs,  it  is  not
clear  that  all maintenance  programs  take  precedence  over  construction
projects  or that,  given  fungibility,  earmarking  really  does  lead  to an
improved  mix  of  highway  expenditures.
27.  Subsequent  evaluations  of  the  Bank's  experience  in  five  countries
--  Ghana,  Zaire,  Central  Africa  Republic,  Mali,  and  Colombia  --  confirm  the- 23 -
skepticism  about  road  funds  expreased  in  the  1985  Policy  Note. 21 Only  in
the  case  of  Ghana  could  earmarking  be  claimed  to  have  been  successful.  The
creation  of a road fund appears to have assured the more timely
distribution  of funds  and  sharp  increaseo  in  allocations  for  maintenance
and  rehabilitation.  The  deterioration  of  the  road  network  during  a long
period of economic  mismanagement  and the consequent  threat  to the
government's  economic  recovery  program  appear  to  have  strengthened  the
government's  resolve  to assure  adequate  funding.  In the remaining
countries,  road  iunds  have--at  least  for  a time--helped  to get  around
cumbersome  budgetary  procedures  and,  because  of more  assured  funding,
permitted  increased  use  of  private  contractors  through  competitive  bidding. 22
The  quest  for  larger  allocations  and  greater  stability  of  funding  appears
to  have  been  more  elusive,  however.
28.  A number  of  broad  conclusions  emerge  from  the  Bank  staff's  survey
of  the  experience  with  road  funds:
vj/  See  F.  Johansen  (ed.),  Earmarking.  Road  Funds  and  Toll  Roads  - A  World
Bank SvmRosium  (Infrastructure  and Urban Development  Department;
Discussion  Paper  Report  No.  INU45;  June  1989);  and  William  A.  McCleary
and Evamaria  Uribe  Tobon,  The Earmarking  of Government  Revenues  in
Colombia  (World  Bank;  Policy,  Planning  and  Research  Working  Paper,
forthcoming,  1989).
22 A general  observation  can  be  made  that  officials  in  agencies  receiving
earmarked funds support earmarking arrangements;  often such
arrangements  by-pass  much  budgetary  red  tape,  allow  more  timely  receipt
of  funds,  and  permit  better  planning.  However,  it  does  not  follow  that
society  also  benefits  from  such  arrangements  unless  the  priority  of  the
expenditures  can  be established  and  it  can  be shown  that  appropriate
expenditure  levels  result.  Otherwise,  earmarking  involves  the  creation
of  a  new  inefficiency  to  correct  an  old  one.- 24  -
o  It is  hard to set  appropriate  prices  for road  funds;  specific
taxes  or ad valorem  taxes  linked  to administered  fuel  prices  very
quickly  erode  road  fund  resources  in  an  inflationary  environment.
O  Allocations  for  road  funds  appear  to  depend  on  the  general  budget
situation. In cases  of budget  stringency,  eaDr'uaked  funds  may be
temporarily  frozen  (for  example,  Ghana),  diverted  to  other  uses  (for
example,  Mali)  or  the  government  and  public  enterptises  may  stop  paying
their  fuel  bills  and  hence  fuel  taxes  (for  example,  Zaire).
O  Road  funds  are  more  vulneroble  to  general  budgetary  problems  the
more  they  are  dependent  on  periodic  changes  in  fuel  prices  or  tax  rates
and  (obviously)  the  smaller  earmarked  taxes  are  as  a  proportion  of  road
fund  resources.
O  The  adequacy  of  overall  road  fund  resources  provides  no  assurance
that  the  appropriate  mix  between  maintenance,  rehabilitation  and  new
investments  will  be  struck.
The  message  that  comes  through  is that  road  funds  are  not the  easy  or
obvious  solutions  to  underfunding  of  highway  expenditures  that  they  appear
to  be. It  is  difficult  to  set  up  a  pricing  arrangement  that  will  generate
an appropriate  amount  of resources  for the sector  without  periodic
decisions  by officials.  The purported  independence  from  general  budget
problems  is  largely  illusory  since  there  are  many  ways  governments  can  tap
into  earmarked  monies  when  budget  conditions  get  tight. 23 Only  when  a
IV  This  has  also  been  the  experience  in  the  United  States  where  earmarked
program  in  highways,  aviation,  and  waterways  have  not  been  exempt  from
general  budget  retrenchments  or from  year-to-year  decisions  about
appropriate  expenditure  levels  regardless  of the size  of available
revenues.  See  Jenifer  W.  Short  "Earmarking  for  Transportation  - A  View
of  the  U.S.  Experience"  in  Frida  Johansen,  ge. =.,  pp.  74-89.25  -
government  is  couitted  to  highway  expenditures  as  a  priority  (as  in  Ghana)
will  the  funds  be safe;  in  such  cases,  one  suspects  that  the  outcome  of
general  fund  financing  would  not  have  been  much  different.
B.  Earmarkin at  the  Local  Goy  t  L  :  The  Is-  l  of  Colombials
Valorization  Tax
29.  The  possibilities  for  successful  earmarking  appear  to  increase  in
more decentralized,  local  government  settings. These  situations  allow
easier  identification  of  beneficiaries,  more  opportunities  for  articulation
of  voter/user  preferences  about  appropriate  levels  and  quality  of  services
and methods  of financing,  and (because  of the localized  nature  of the
benefits)  less opportunity  to pass the costs of programs  to non-
beneficiaries.  Thus,  at the local  level,  one finds  the  use  of special
assessments  (specific  expenditures  linked  to changes  in tax rates  or
betterment/valorization  taxes);  special  purpose  governments  (such  as
special  districts  for  water  and  sewerage  or  for  schools  financed  from  fees
or  property  tax  assessments);  and  various  services  provided  for  a charge
(for  example,  local  transport,  garbage  removal).  All  of these  represent
earmarking  in  various  guises.
30.  One  point  is  worth  stressing.  The  link  between  expenditures  and
revenues  in these  arrangements  is  extremnly  close. In fact,  often  the
level of government  activity  or service  is proposed  and then are
appropriate  financing  arrangement  decided  upon.  Because  of this,  the
danger  of  a  mismatch  between  appropriate  levels  of  revenues  and  activities
is  substantially  reduced;  hence  the  danger  of  over-  or  underinvestment
-- such  as  can  occur  when  expenditures  are  linked  to  a  revenue  source  that
is  set more  or less  arbitrarily  (as,  for  example,  with  fuel  taxes  and
highway  expenditures)--is  mitigated. However,  this  gain  may be at the- 26 -
expense of the  automaticity  and insulation  from  general  budget
considerations,  often  thought  of  as  the  virtues  of  earmarking.  The  more
frequently  decisions  must  be  made about  appropriate  Levels  of  expenditures
and  revenues,  the  more  voters  and  officials  will  be fotzed  to  choose  among
competing  uses  for  the  funds  and  the  less  certain  financing  becomes.
31.  Colombia's  municipal  valorization  tax (similar  to  what are  called
special  assessments  or betterment  taxes  in other  countries)  represents  a
rather  pure  forn  of earmarking. 24 This  purity  results  from  several  of the
tax's  characteristics:
(a)  the fact that taxpayers and beneficiaries  overlap to a
substantial  degree;
(b)  the  use of benefit-cost  type considerations  ("appraisal'  or
"analysis 3 would  be too  strong  a  word)  and  the  conscious  and
conscientious  attempt  to  allocate  tax  assessm'ents
proportionally according to how people benefit from the
project;  and
(c)  the  strong  link  between  valorization  revenues  and
expenditures (i.e. no supplements  from or diversions to
general  fund  financing,  at least  in  principla).
In addition, valorization appears to reverse the usual  sequence of
earmarking  whereby available  revenues  drive expenditure  levels:  instead,
2&W See W.G. Rhoads and R.M. Bird. "Financing  Urbanization  by Benefit
Taxation" Land  Economics 43  (November 1967), pp.  403-12; IBRD
Valorization  Charges  as a Method  for  Financing  Urban  Public  Works:  The
Exanla of Bogota..  Colombia  Staff  Working  Paper  No. 254 (March  1977);
and  R.N.  Bird, Intergovernmental  Finance  in Colombia:  Final  Report  of
the Mission  on Intergovernmental  Finance  (International  Tax Program;
The  Law  School  of Harvard  University;  Cambridge,  1984),  pp.  87-115.- 27  -
the  identification  of  desirable  projects,  often  within  the  scope  of
prepared  investment  programs,  appears  to  call  forth  efforts  to  raise
financing  from  prospective  beneficiaries.
32.  Upon  the  selection  of  a  project  suitable  for  valorization
taxation,  a  "zone  of  influence"  is  demarcated,  the  area  over  which  benefits
are  expected  to  be  felt.  Benefits  are  estimated  --  as  the  total  resulting
rise  of  site  values  --  and  allocated  across  the  properties  within  the  zone
according  to  formulas  which  take  into  account  a  number  of  characteristics
such  as  size,  shapa,  topography,  frontage,  distance  from  project,  and  a
number of  economic  factors.  Over  time,  the  scope  of  valorization  has  been
extended  to  include  street  construction,  local  paving,  parking  facilities,
urban  development  and  what  are  called  'green  spaces".  In  principle,  there
is  nothing  to  stop  authorities  from  attempting  to  recapture  some or  all.  of
the  project  (net)  benefits,  but  in  practice  only  full  recovery  of  the  costs
of  land,  construction,  and  some  interest  and  administrative  expenses  is
sought.  In  addition,  consideration  is  given  to  problems  that  the  poor  or
persons  with  few  liquid  assets  might  have  in  paying  the  tax.  Low income
persons  can  be  exempted  altogether  and  others  are  allowed  to  stretch  out
payment  over  several  years  if  otherwise  it  would  absorb  a  significant
fraction  of  their  annual  income.
33.  The  valorization  tax  as  practiced  obviously  has  a  number  of
desirable  features  --  the  benefit  connection;  the  efforts  to  select
projects  where  the  gains  clearly  exceed  the  costs,  and  the  flexibility  with
which  it  has  been  adopted  in  differing  circumstances.  As  a  tax  on  the
unimproved  value  of  land,  the  tax  would  have  no  adverse  incentive  effects,
and  in  fact  the  combination  of  the  tax  and  improvement  serve  to  raise
income  and  increase  the  potential  profitability  of  investments  which  should- 28  -
have  a  desirable  incentive  effect. It  has raised  sizable  revenues  and
financed  a  significant  fraction  of  improvements  in  Colombia's  cities.
34.  On the other hand, valorization  does have some drawbacks,
primarily  centered  around  collections  problems. First,  quite  aside  from
the fact that authorities  attempt  to recover  only project  costs,
collections  fall  far  short  of  100  percent.  The  reasons  appear  to  be  cost
overruns,  generous  exemptions  (for  example,  the  Catholic  Church,  charitable
institutions,  and  public  enterprises),  and generous  exceptions/payment
schedules  given  to  the  poor  and  those  with  liquidity  problems.  Problems
have  particularly  arisen  when projects  have  been designed  to improve
conditions  in low income  areas.  Second,  the  concept  of the 'zone  of
influence"  has  its  limitations:  in  a number  of  cases,  a sizable  fraction
of beneficiaries  fall  outside  the  zone,  and this  has led  to collection
problems  because  persons  within  the  zone  were  reluctant  to  pick  up  the
added  burden.  It  is  also  hard  to  implement  with  a  number  of  projects
simultaneously  affecting  a  number  of  overlapping  zones.  Lastly,
valorization  revenues  have  proven  to  be  quite  unstable  in  part  because  of
collection  problems  and  in  part  to  administrative  deficiencies  in  planning
and  implementing  projects;  thus  revenue  growth  seems  to  be  characterized  by
periods  of  stagnation  followed  by  sizable  increases.
35.  Despite  its imperfections,  valorization  deserves  a favorable
rating.  Its  popularity  and  its  ability  to  raise  revenues  would  justify  its
continuation  and  extension  into  citiea  which  have  not  taken  full  advantage
of  it. Its  weaknesses  could  be  reduced  by cutting  back  on  exemptions  and
the  introduction  of  interest  payments  and  penalties  on  arrears  (the  former- 29  -
was  introduced  in  1981).  Further,  where  there  are  substantial  numbers  who
are  unable  to  pay  and  subsidlzation  of  such  low  income  persons  is  a  key
project  objective,  experience  has  shown  that  income  redistribution
objectives  are  not  readily  served  within  the  context  of
valorization/betterment  taxes.  In  such  cases,  the  need  for  transfers
should  be  made  explicit  and  financed  from  general  budget  revenues.
C.  Two Countries  with  Widespread  Ermarkina:  Turkev  and  Colombia
36.  Turkey  and  Colombia  are  both  prolific  earmarkers.  In  both  cases,
earmarking  has  passed  a  level  which  is sensible  and  could  possibly  be
justified,  resulting  in  a  significant  misallocation  of  resources.  There
are,  however,  a  number  of  contrasts  between  the  two  countries.  In  Colombia
earmarking  is  a  much  larger  share  of  government  revenues.  In  Turkey,
earmarking  is a  recent  response  to  budgetary  stringency  while  in  Colombia
its  a  practice  of  long-standing.  Turkey's  earmarking  is  mainly  off-budget
while  Colombia's  is  almost  entirely  on-budget.
37*  TurkX. 2 5 Some of  Turkey's  extra-budgetary  funds  (EBFs)  are  quite
old  but  the  bulk  are  of  recent  origin,  mainly  a  response  to  the  budgetary
problems  of  the  1980s.  As  a  consequence,  EBFs  have  grown  from  the
equivalent  8% of  central  government  budget  revenues  (1.4%  of  GNP)  in  1983
to  over  20% of  government  revenues  or  more  than  41  of  GNP in  1987.  This,
in  a  country  where  central  government  revenues  (as  a  share  of  GNP,
including  EBFs)  have  been  falling  --  from  21% in  1980  to  18% in  1987.
j.  IBRD Fiscal Policy  and  Tax  Reform  in  Turkey  (No.  6374-TU),  Vol.  I,
Chapter  VII  and  Operations  Evaluation  Department  (IBRD) Evaluation  of
Structural  Adiustment  Lending  in  Turkey  Program  Performance  Audit
Report  of  the  Fourth  and  Fifth  Structural  Adjustment  Loans  and  Overview
of  SA  . I-V,  (Report  No.  7205,  Washington,  D.C.,  April  13,  1988).- 30  -
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38.  The  purposes  and  sources  of funding  for  the  major  EBFs  is  shown  in
Table  2.  The  purposes  are  quite  varied,  ranging  from  quite  specific  (e.g.
support for defense industry investment,  housing subsidy, fertilizer
subsidy) to more general (e.g.  export  and investment  subsidies,  export
promotion  through  marketing  and advertising)  to even  more general  (an  EBF
to raise  money  for  other  EBFs). For  example,  the  biggest  ftnd,  the  Public
Participation Fund, which builds and sells participations in large
lnfrastructure  projects,  receives  money  from  the  petroleum  consumption  tax
and can  borrow  domestically. The second  largest,  tle  Mass Housing  Fund,
provLdes  credlt  for  small  housing  units  and land  acquisitions  and  receives
the bulk of its financing  from earmarked  taxes --  from variable  import
levies,  the  supplementary  VAT,  petroleum  product  taxes  and  the  $100  exit
tax  on Turkish  citizens. !.evenues  for  the  EBFs  are  obtained  from  tex (68%)
and  from  non-tax  (32%)  sources. Some  funds  have  authority  to  borrow  but to
date the amounts  involved  have been quite  small.  Major tax  sources  were
import  duties  (18%  of total  revenue),  export  taxes  (13%),  petroleum  taxes
(20%),  financial  transactions  (10%)  followed  by excises  on tobacco,  alcohol
and beverages.  Non-tax  revenues  included  the proceeds  of lotteries  and
gambling houses, various fees and penalties, operating income from
infrastructural  facilities  and  interest  income  on financial  assets.
39.  In general,  EBFs are established  by decree  following  approval  by
the Council of Ministers.  The decree specifies the EBF's purposes;
eligible expenditures;  sources of revenues and rates of tax/surcharge
and/or  rates of subsidy  involved.  In some instances,  the decree is so
specific that the Council of Ministers determines the EBFs charter,
policies,  operating  framework  and budget.  Then the EBF has no separate
management  board and the fund is merely  an account  held at the central- 32 -
bank.  In  other  instances,  the  fund  has  a  separate  board  and  management
body. There  is  no  single  authority  which  supervises  all  the  EBFs.
40.  Earmarking,  as  practiced  in  Turkey,  contains  a  number  of  serious
drawbacks. First,  it contributes  little,  if anything,  to Government
efforts  to  raise  more  resources.  The  rise  of the  EBFa  has accompanied
falling  shares  of  government  expenditures  and  government  revenues  in  GNP.
They  are  pre-empting  a  greater  share  of  public  revenues  and  contribute
directly  to  a  decline  in  central  government  revenues.  For  example,  import
levies  on  particular  products  reduce  imports  and  hence  the  amount  of  import
duties  flowing  to  the  central  budget  from  these  products.  Similarly,  other
special  indirect  taxes  can  reduce  budgetary  revenues  by  reducing  demand  or
profits.  Second,  with  the  lack  of  effective  overall  organization,  it is
clear  that  the  policies  of  some  EBFs  run  counter  to  those  of  other  EBFs  or
to those  of the  Government.  For  example,  reliance  on export  taxes  and
import  duties  is  contrary  to  government  objectives  of  a  more  open  export-
oriented  strategy.  The  use  of special  import  levies  runs  counter  to the
trend  toward  reduced  quantitative  restrictions  and  tariffs  and  introduces
the potential  for quite arbitrary,  uneven  protection  across  various
sectors. While  the  Government  encourages  private  initiatives  and gives
investment  incentives,  one fund  relies  on taxes  on bank loans  to the
private  sector  in  order  to  subsidize  exports  and  investments.  At  one  time
in the past (it apparently  has stopped),  two funds  were taxing  and
subsidizing  agricultural  exports  at  the  same  rate. Thirdly,  the  practice
of EBFs in Turkey  strays  quite  far from the  benefit  principle. In
virtually  no case is there  a linkage  between  the beneficiaries  of
government  expenditures  and  the  persons  financing  these  expenditures  (the
only  minor  exception  is the  use of part  of the  taxes  on petroleum  to
finance  highways).  Earmarking  instead  represents  the  arbitrary  assignment- 33  -
of  certain  tax  revenues  for  the  finance  of  supposedly  desirable  government
programs.  Under  these  cLrcumstances,  revenues  provide  no  guidelines  about
desirable  levels  of  the  service  to  be  provided.  Lastly,  and  relatedly,  it
is  not  at  all  clear  what  project  evaluation  criteria  the  EBFs  must  meet  and
hov  rigorous  these  are  compared  to  those  for  regular  budget  expenditures.
In  sum,  given  the  slze  of  the  EBFs  and  the  lack  of  coordination  and
control,  there  is  a  potential  for  a  major  misallocation  of  resources.
41.  Colmbla. 26 Unlike  Turkey,  most  of  Colombia's  earmarking  comes
from  old,  established  funds  which  were  created  two  decades  ago  and  more
(see  Table  3). The  rise  in  earmarking  in  the  period  since  has  been  mainly
a  consequence  of  revenue  sharing  and  rather  buoyant  sources  of  revenue  for
some  of the  major  funds.  Colombia's  earmarking  is a product  of its
political  history--a  long  struggle  over  the  question  of  centralization  vs.
decentralization  and  significant  periods  of  political  tension  and  viclence.
Under these  circumstances,  earmarking  emerges  as a  way of committing
government  to  continue  specific  activities  regardless  of  shifting  political
circumstances  and  of getting  around  elaborate  budgetary  controls  designed
to  prevent  misuse  of  funds.  Earmarking  in  the  form  of  the  automatic
sharing  of  specified  central  government  revenue  sources  is  an  attempt  at
reversing  centralization  to a  certain  extent  and supporting  increased
activity  at the  departmental  (provincial)  and,  more  recently,  municipal
levels.
42.  Earmarklng  has grown  very  rapidly  during  the  past two  decades.
From 11% in  19'0,  the  proportion  of  national  govarnment  revenues  earmarked
rose  to  28%  by  196.  The  proportion  of  revenues  earmarked  at  all  levels  of
government  rose  from 21% to 32%  between  the same  two  years.  Whereas
2j  See  William  A.  McCleary  and  Evamaria  Uribe  Tobon,  Mg..  =- 34  -
TABLE  3  COLOHelA'S PRINCIPAL  EAUHAUUD  FUNDS
1986  1987
Date  Revenue  Revenue  Major  Sources
Recipient  Established  (millions  of Colombia  pease)  of  Revenue  Najor  Area  of  Use
A.  National  Level
National  Highway
Fund  (et.  Al)  1967  46,493  59.600  Fuel  Taxes  Transportation  invest-
ment  with  751  for
national  highways.  1o
for  neighborhood  roads.
102  for  national  rail-
ways.  and  52  for  urban
transport
PROEXPO  1967  27.038  43.200  Levy  on  imports  Subsidized  credit  for
exports
National  Coffee
Fund  1940  17.886  14,005  Taxes  on  value  Zconomic  and  social
of coffee  exporte  investments  in  coffee
and  retention  areaeg  various  equity
on volums  and  financial  invest-
ment;  coffee  price
stabilization
National  Apprentice-  1957  18,256  23.195  Payroll  Taxes  Technical  skills  training
ship  Service  (SENA)
Family  Welfare  1968  17,831  23.534  Payroll  Taxes  Programs  for  protection
Institute  (ICBF)  of  children  and family
D. Dpartmental
Sectional  Health  n.a.  Taxes  on  beer.  Health  expenditures
Services  I  wine,  liquor
78,461
Sectional  Sports  n.a.  Taxes on  cigarettes  Support  of  sorts
Commissions  activities
C. Municipl Level
Municipal  Improve.  1921  6,967  Tax  on increases  in  Investment  in  roads.
ments  unimproved  value  of  water,  ever,  parks.
land  (valorization  etc.
tax)
D.  Interpoveremental  Transfers
Departments  and  1971  75,838  109.862  Share  of  total  Education  and  health




Municipalities  1968  55.590  80,432  Share  of value  Specified  municipal
added  tax  revenues  investents- 35 -
departmental  and  national  level  earmarking  were  equally  important  in  1970,
the earmarking  of central  government  revenues  was responsible  for  this
surge  and  now  accounts  for  75%  of  earmarking  at  all  levels  of  government.
The  largest  sources  of earmarking  presently  are (with  the  percentage  of
total earmarking  accounted  for in parentheses):  revenue  sharing  for
education  and health  and for specified  munilcipal  investments  (35%);
departmental  sin  taxes  (alcohol,  tobacco,  gambling)  for  health  and  sports
(21%);  the  fuel  tax  for  highway  and  other  transport  expenditures  (12%);
payroll  taxes  to finance  training  and  various  family  welfare  activities
(10%);  the import  levy  to finance  subsidized  credit  for  exports  (9%);
various  levies  on  coffee  exports  to  cover  economic  and  social  investments
in  coffee  areas  and  other  investments  (5%);  and  the  municipal  valorization
tax (2%).  These  seven  sources  account  for  about  94%  of earmarking  in
Colombia.
43.  Aside  from  differences  in the  origins  of earmarking  and  in its
significance  in  public  resources,  there  are  several  contrasts  with  Turkey:
(1)  Colombia's  earmarked  funds  are largely  wlthin  existing  budgets  and
hence their  revenues  and  expenditures  do not detract  so much  from  the
transparency  of government  activities  or the  government's  impact  on the
economy;  (2)  the  system  relies  much  less  heavily  on  import  duties  and  other
taxes  on international  transactions  as a source  of financing;  and (3)  a
greater  proportion  of  earmarking  (though  still  not  a  very  large  proportion)
would  meet  the  test  of  being  benefit  related  (for  example,  the  fuel  tax,
municipal  valorization,  and,  more  loosely,  the  coffee  tax).
44.  That  earmarking  has  become  excessive  has  long  been  recognized  in
Colombia  but  to  date  there  has  been  little  success  in  reducing  its  scope.
The Bird-Wiesner  Commission  on intergovernmental  finances  (1981)  took  a- 36 -
generally  skeptical  but pragmatic  view of earmarking  recognize  that
earmarking  owed  much  of its  origin  to Colombia's  complex  polltical  and
budgetary  situation. 27 It,  therefore,  recommended  a  case-by-case  approach,
eliminating  those  cases of earmarking  which did not fulfil  benefit
principles  or  where  earmarking  was  not a major  source  of flnance. The
CommLssion  on Public  Expenditures  (1986)  took a  much harsher  viow,
accepting  the  Bird-Wiesner  view  that  earmarking  ought  to be limited  to
cases  which  meet  benefit  principle  criteria  but  finding  that  the  overlap
between  tax/price  payors  and  beneficiaries  was absent  in virtually  all
cases. 28 The  Commission  therefore  concluded  that  Colombia's  inefficient
budget  processes  could  not  justify  earmarking  if there  was  no assurance
that  the  appropriate  amount  of resources  would  be devoted  to earmarked
activities  --  i.e.  with one inefficient  practice  substituting  for  another,
there  was no assurance  of an improvement  in national  welfare.  The
Commission,  therefore  concluded  that  earmarking  ought  to  be abolished. 29
To  date  very  little  has  been  done  to  implement  the  recommendations  of  these
two  commissions,  and  in  fact  a  number  of  relatively  small  earmarked  funds
have  been  added.
IV  R.M.  Bird,  Intergovernmental  Finance  in Colombia-Final  Regort  of the
isaion  on Intergovernmental  Finance,  (International  Tax Program:
Harvard  Law  School;  Cambridge,  Massachusetts;  1984).
ZU  Comision  del  Gasto  PIblico,  Informs  Final,  (Bogota,  Colombia;  1986).
22/  In its  definition,  the Commission  did  not include  revenue  sharing,
payroll  taxes  for  social  security,  and  public  enterprises  profits  all
of  which  can  be  considered  as  earmarking  under  a  broader  definition.*  37 -
45.  Colombia's earmarking is too complex to allow blanket
recommendations.  However,  recent  budgetary  reforms  in Colombia  make
reductions  in  the  scope  of  earmarklng  more  feasible  politically  than  in  the
past. If  the  piecemeal  suggestions  made  below  were  adopted  fully,  about
45% of traditional  earmarking  (in  value terms)  would  be eliminated.
Remaining  would  be revenue  sharing,  three  major  cases  of earmarking  and
perhaps  soza  minor  funds. The  objective  would  be to  eliminate  the  most
obvious  cases  of inefficiency.  First,  there  are  a number  of  funds  whose
revenues  and  expenditures  do  not fit  the  benefit  principle  of taxation.
Revenues  generated  are  not  an  adequate  substitute  for  conscious  annual
budget  decisions  on  the  appropriate  level  of  resources  for  the  activity  in
question.  Those  funds  include  import  duties  for  subsidized  export  credit
(PItOEXPO),  payroll  taxes  for  various  social  welfare  objectives  (SENA, ICBF,
etc..),  and  departmental  tax/profits  on  alcohol,  tobacco,  and  gambling  for
health,  welfare  and  sports,  and  a  number  of  minor  funds.  Second,  for  the
remaining  major  funds,  some  adjustments  would  be  desirable  to  move  them
closer  to  benefit  principles;  e.g.  limiting  coffee  fund  expenditures  to  the
coffee  sector  and  growing  areas,  more  frequent  adjustments  in  fuel  taxes  to
generate  the resources  required  for highways,  and extension  of the
valorization  tax  to  additional  Colombian  municipalities.  Thirdly,  revenue
sharing  plays  an  important  role  in  the  government's  efforts  to  decentralize
activities  to  the  departmental  and  municipal  levels.  The  effectiveness  of
revenue  sharing  could  be increased  by changes  in the  formulas  to  remove
anomalies (e.g. the undue favoritism given to areas with small
populations),  increases  in incentives  to  generate  resouArces  at the  local
level,  and measures  to  increase  municipal  absorptive  capacity.- 38 -
III. CONCLUSIONO  AND  RECONSDATIONS
46.  Several  broad conclusions  can  be drawn  from the  foregoing  review
of the llterature  or the theory  and experience  of earmarking.  First,
however  much the IMF and Bank  have condemned  it in the  past, there  is no
general  presumption  against  earmarking.  In theory,  as Buchanan,  Goetz,  and
other  public  choice  economists  have shown,  it may make possible  agreement
on additional  revenues  and expenditures  where there  would  be no consensus
about either  separately. It may protect  priority  programs  from  shifting
majorities,  administrative  inefficiency, and  corruption  (although
experience  shown  that  often  apparently  low  priLrity  programs  get  protected
also).  In practice, there are examples  of successful  earmarking,  the
successeE  being  clustered  in  the  areas  of revenue  sharing,  social  security,
special  assessments (betterment or valorization taxes) and special
districts  (e.g.  for  water and sewerage,  education). Earmarking  in other
areas --  requiring  specific  taxes to finance  narrowly  defined  government
expenditure programs (e.g. highways, housing, and training)  has been
notably  less successful. Secondly,  tax/price  arrangements  for earmarked
funds should  meet the same efficiency/equity  tests  as for pricing  public
sector goods in general and in addition should provide a reasonably
automatic source of financing (i.e. independent  from general budget
considerations).  Meeting  these  two  criteria  aLmultaneously  is  likely  to  be
difficult. Efficient  pricing  and taxation  is likel'  to dictate  unbalanced
budgets for the earmarked fund and henc_ an inLerdependence  with the
general  budget.  In practice,  governments  generally  override  earmarking
arrangements if they need the resources.  The protection given by
earmarking  has proven  sometwhat  illusory  and  evaporates  when  budgets  become
tight.39
47.  Thirdly,  earmarking  works  best  where  it is  an extension  of the
benefit  principle  of  taxation.  However,  the  efficiency/equity  objectives
of  benefit  taxation  can  usually  be  met  through  general  fund  financing  and
earmarking  needs  to  be  justified  by  consideration  of  additional  objectives
--  e.g.  that  it  is  needed  to  protect  levels  of  the  service,  improve  revenue
collections,  or improve  quality  of the  service.  By the  same  reasoning,
earmarking  is  not  desirable  for  programs  with  strong  redistributional  or
social  welfare  objectives  because  the  connection  between  revenues  and
appropriate  program  levels  are  tenuous  or  nonexistent  or  for  pure  public
goods  where  taxpayers  will  not  reveal  their  preferences  through  voluntary
individual  payments. 30 Fourthly,  the  World  Bank's  longstanding  skepticim
about  highway  funds  is  amply  justified  by  experience.  Notwithstanding  the
fact  that  many  highway  officials  like  them  because  they  simplify  budgetary
procedures  and  appear  to  make  funding  more  certain,  experience  shows  that
the financing  they  provide  is not automatic  and remains  dependent  on
government  judgments  which  change  as  budget  considerations  dictate.
48.  Fifth,  earmarking  appears  to  work more successfully  in local
government  settings  where  the  correspondence  of  beneficiaries  and  taxpayers
is  closer  and  where  voter/user  preferences  can  more  easily  be expressed.
Expenditures  and revenues  for specific  activities  are linked  through
periodic votes and/or assessments  which provides a check on the
3/  The  exception  to  this  statement  would  be local  public  goods  where  the
absence of large numbers creates a  greater incentive for
voter/taxpayers  to express  their preferences  and to finance  the
expenditures  through  betterment  levies  or  property  taxes.- 40
appropriateness  of  decisions.  Sixth,  there  are  limitations  to  the  extent
of  earmarking  at  any  level  of  government.  These  lisits  stem  from  the
limited cases where the benefit principle  applies; the costs of
fractionalization  of  decision-making;  and  possible  tradeoffs  with  revenue
mobilization  for  the  general  budget. In  those  countries  wher earmarking
has  become  extensive  (e.g.  Turkey,  Colombia),  there  appear  to  be  numerous
cases  where  it  is  not  justified  and  ought  to  be  abolished.
49.  In conclusion,  the  practice  of  earmarking  cannot  be universally
ruled  out,  but  there  are  certainly  grounds  for  skepticism  about  how  well  it
is likely  to work in  practice. If past  experience  is  any  guide,  any
proposed  scheme  of  earmarking  carries  its  own  set  of  potential  problems  in
addition  to  the  fact  it  shelters  one  type  of  government  expenditures  from
having  to compete  for  funding  with  other  types  of expenditures  --  e.g.,
questions  about  the adequacy  of resources  to  meet  sectoral  needs,  the
adequacy  of  the  institution  designated  to  carry  out  the  earmarked  activity,
lack  of  control  or  scrutiny  over  expenditure  priorities  or  administrative
outlays,  and  possible  conflicts  with  the  government's  ability  to raise
resources  for  the  general  budget  or  with  other  government  policies.  This
suggests  that  proposals  to  create  earmarked  funds  be  approached  with
skepticism  and  that  each  earmarking  scheme be  called  upon  to  meet  a  series
of  tests  to  ensure  that  it  does  in  fact  represent  an  improvement.
Satisfying  the  following  tests  is  a  formidable  enough  task  that  the  scope
of  earmarking  would  likely  be  quite  limited  in  practice:
o  Is  there  a  strong  link  between  beneficiaries  and  tax/price
payers.- 41  -
o  Is earmarking  necessary  (in addition  to benefit
taxation/charges)  to ensure  levels  of service  or improve
revenue  collection  or  service  quality.
o  Will  the  price/tax  (and  other  financing)  arrangements  for
the  earmarked  expenditure  lead  to  levels  of  resources
appropriate  to  present  and  expected  le7els  of  demand
o  Will the price/tax arrangements  have (significant)
distortionary  effects  on  the  allocation  of  resources  (e.g.,
deadweight  losses,  inflationaiy  impacts).
o  Is  there  an  appropriate  investment  program  and  a  clear  set
of  rules  for  decisions  regarding  investment,  regarding  the
mix  of  capital,  O&M and  rehabilitation  expenditures,  and
regarding  administrative  overheads.
o  Is  there  a  set  of  controls  (accounting,  auditing)  guarding
against  the  misuse  or  diversion  of  funds.
O  Is  the  expenditure  program  and  its  financing  consistent  with
the government's overall  macroeconomic  and resource
allocation  policies  (or,  better,  is there  a government
comuittee  or  agency  which  oversees  extra-budgetary  funds  and
assures  that  their  activities  are  consistent  with  government
policies).
o  Is  there  an  agency  with  the  demonstrated  capacity  to  plan,
evaluate,  and  carry  out  the  program  (or  confidence  that  one
can  be  created).
o  Is  there  a  cutoff  date  for  deciding  whether  the  earmarking
arrangements  should  be  continued.- 42 -
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